






On the future of the Left: 
A global perspective
Abstract 
The crisis of the Left has many reasons and causes, some of 
which are understandable in terms of classical rhetoric: ethos, 
pathos and logos. Yet this crisis has real causes not reducible 
to language and rhetoric alone. Attempts at “modernization” 
of social democracy have eroded hope, while the supposed 
Soviet legacy has continued to haunt the more “radical” Left 
movements and parties. Over time, collective memory shifts 
and political audience changes. The two recently most-success-
ful leftist parties have emerged from social movements: Syriza 
and Podemos have consciously adopted left-wing populist 
stances. A problem is that the story of “people versus the 
dominant elite” loses part of its emotional appeal if the repre-
sentatives of the “people” appear to be enmeshed with “elite” 
practices either in one’s own country or elsewhere. The fate of 
Syriza reveals also how difficult it is to make even a moderate 
and cautious turn toward the Left, unless there is a broader 
European or worldwide movement behind it. It is here further 
argued that there is no automatic or mechanical Polanyian 
“double movement”. Rather, world history depends also on 
agency. The discrepancy between territorial states and global 
capital is an obstacle that can be best overcome by globalizing 
democratic-socialist politics. It is argued that far from being 
exhausted as a project or in terms of pathos, a grand task 
awaits the Left. Social freedom can be increased. Obstacles can 
be removed. Existing global political economy contradictions 
and global problems can be resolved by means of rational 
collective actions and by the building of more adequate com-
mon institutions. An experimentalist leftist vision can inspire 
hope and optimism about our future possibilities.








 The Left often talks about crises, but is arguably itself em-
broiled in a crisis at the beginning of the 2020s. Decades of neolib-
eralism have not led to a resurgence of the Left, except in a limited 
manner (more about these countertrends see below). Rather, in 
many places, the nationalist populist Right has seized ground from 
the mainstream parties and perhaps especially so from leftist par-
ties. Mainstream politics has become fragmented and divisive. Pro-
cesses of disintegration characterize European and global politics, 
as evidenced by Ukraine, Brexit, Trump, and the US-China trade 
war. Within the EU, right-wing national–populist forces have turned 
Poland and Hungary toward increasingly authoritarian governance, 
and the European Parliament has become more split and parti-
tioned. In Erdoğan’s Turkey, the failed 2016 coup attempt and its 
repressive aftermath have all but ended EU membership talks. Tur-
key is now on the brink of dictatorship, in spite of ongoing demo-
cratic resistance. Similar national–populist developments can be 
observed also elsewhere, for example in Brazil, Indonesia and the 
Philippines (Patomäki 2018). 
It is in this geo-historical context that the COVID-19 crisis and 
its consequences have unfolded. A crisis is existential. It is a turning 
point in a process that can lead to a change in the existence, nature 
or identity of a community, organization or system. Etymologically, 
the term ‘crisis’ is linked to the word ‘criticism’: it suggests that 
there is a crucial turning point ahead. Criticism concerns the causes 
of the crisis, while the crisis provides also an opportunity to learn. 
This is the context within which the current crisis of the Left must 
be understood. The crisis of the Left has many intertwined reasons 
and causes, some of which are understandable in terms of the ba-
sic formula of classical rhetoric – ethos (character and credibility of 
the speaker), pathos (emotional framing of the issue), and logos 
(plausible reasoning, argument and demonstration). These distinc-
tions were originally made by Aristotle in The Art of Rhetoric (1991), 
and remain useful also in the 21st century. 
At the heart of the rhetoric of contemporary populism lies the 
idea of “people” as a morally good force, which is set against the 







the character and credibility of actors and gives emotional meaning 
to stories that explain problems and insecurities of everyday life in 
terms of the actions and policies of the “elite”. Attempts to turn 
populist categories and framings to support leftist causes (Laclau 
2005) are not entirely without merit. But the crisis of the Left has 
also real causes not reducible to language and rhetoric (cf. the de-
bate Laclau vs. Bhaskar 1998). The dispositions of the audience in 
modern capitalist market societies tend to evolve through the dy-
namics of political economy. Essential changes have occurred as a 
consequence of processes such as globalization and deindustrial-
ization. Moreover, feasible and viable institutional and policy alter-
natives are unlikely to emerge from a mere analysis of rhetoric. 
Ethos concerns the extent to which the speaker is able to con-
vince the public that they are credible. Pathos, on the other hand, 
means appealing to emotions in a way that often involves some 
grandiosity and high-mindedness. However, pathos can at least as 
importantly stem from identification with the suffering of others. 
This requires identification marked by the pronoun “we”. And there 
are further possibilities. In part two of Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses 
a number of emotions that can be relevant in persuading the audi-
ence: anger, calm, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, 
shame, favour, pity, envy and jealousy. A successful pathos requires 
the speaker to put their feelings into play, perhaps making the au-
dience laugh and cry. The most important means to achieving an 
impression at the level of pathos is through a story resonating with 
the audience’s life experiences and taken-for-granted categories of 
everyday practice, however fragmented they may be (MacIntyre 
2007; Ricoeur 1984). Our experiences are expressed and shared as 
stories. Words and deeds become understandable as parts of sto-
ries, including the character of actors and their actions, their vices 
and virtues. Local or small-scale stories acquire their full meaning 
through merging with grander stories that relate the life of an indi-
vidual or community to larger processes.
Logos, in turn, refers to rational argumentation in contexts 
where uncertainty prevails, and claims are only to be deemed more 
or less plausible or probable. Well-informed plausible reasoning im-
proves the speaker’s reliability and makes them look prepared and 






and attempts to understand and explain it can easily appear de-
tached from the common-sense viewpoint involving immediate ev-
eryday categories and concerns. What the Left nonetheless needs 
is a systematic analysis of the processes conditioning the possibili-
ties for democratic and emancipatory politics under the circum-
stances of the early 21st century, characterized by processes such 
as neoliberal globalization (verging already on de-globalization) 
and de-industrialization. Truth matters. It is not only that political 
programs must be designed accordingly, but better stories about 
politics and our place in the wider scheme of things must reflect 
our understanding of the obstacles to be removed and replaced by 
something better. In order to appeal at the level of ethos and pa-
thos, the analysis must be related back to everyday experiences.
The character and credibility of the Left in the 21st century: 
The case of Finland
Although geo-historical experiences vary, and each leftist party 
has in its own way(s) a unique history, there are also broad directions 
around which these experiences tend to converge. Since the 1970s – 
following defeats such as those related to wage-earner funds in 
Sweden in the 1970s and to Mitterrand’s socialist program in France 
in the early 1980s – social democratic and socialist parties began to 
retreat from their more ambitious programs. As a result of these de-
velopments, the “Third Way” came to be redefined already in the 
1980s and 1990s as a compromise between pure social democracy 
and neoliberalism, rather than as a third way between capitalism and 
communism (for discussions, see Ryner 2002; Patomäki 2000; 2003). 
What emerged was an attempt to “modernize” social democracy 
(e.g. Moschonas 2002) in a context where common sense incorporat-
ed a version of the Enlightenment belief in a progressive time, and 
where Margaret Thatcher and other market-oriented conservatives 
succeeded – even if only partially and paradoxically – in claiming the 
direction of “progress”.1 This kind of “modernization” has eroded 
1   Anthony Giddens (1994) remarked that, for some two centuries, socialism 
was the keenest advocate of “progressivism”, which he defines as the no-







hope; and without curiosity, hope and imagination, the inner motiva-
tion for social/democratic actions tends to weaken.
By 1989, the socialist and communist parties either started to 
follow suit, however reluctantly, or found themselves in a legitima-
tion crisis (in the April 1989 elections in Poland, the Communist 
Party lost every single seat contested in the Parliament). The Left 
Alliance in Finland exemplifies these tendencies. It was founded in 
1990 to succeed the Finnish People’s Democratic League (known as 
SKDL), which included the Communist Party of Finland. In elections 
between 1945 and 1966, the SKDL gained more than 20% of votes, 
and in 1966 SDP and SKDL formed a majority in the parliament, but 
by 1987 the SKDL share of votes was down to 9.7%. Moreover, the 
party split, with the two main sides becoming increasingly at log-
gerheads. The democratic majority of the party had long taken in-
dependent stances – for instance, the SKDL was the only party in 
Finland to condemn the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 
1968 – and was consistently willing to work with the social demo-
crats, whereas the Communist Party was usually loyal to the Soviet 
leadership, which in turn also supported the party financially (with 
the accumulated wealth of the party eventually being destroyed in 
financial speculation). The end and a new beginning came in 1990, 
when the Left Alliance was founded. 
At the level of ethos, these kinds of historical developments 
continue to pose problems to many leftist parties in Europe and 
across the world. The problem for anyone speaking on behalf of a 
neoliberalized social democratic party is that the discipline of “free 
help speed up the journey toward the desired end-point. Giddens was also 
among the first to see how Thatcherism captured the notion of progress 
as a particular response to the economic troubles in Britain in the 1970s, 
following an era of constructing a democratic welfare state. A key para-
dox here is that neoliberal intellectuals such as Milton Friedman and Frie-
drich Hayek were essentially conservatives and advocated a return to 
what they considered pure classical economic liberalism. “We neither can 
wish nor possess the power to go back to the reality of the nineteenth 
century, [however], we have the opportunity to realize its ideals” (Hayek 
1944: 240). It is also noteworthy that due to manifold 20th-century twists 
and turns in the dominant conception of time (from the catastrophe of 
the First World War to the postmodernism of the 1980s and 1990s), what 
remained was a techno-commercial version of the belief in linear progres-
sive time that is quite different from the 18th or 19th century metaphysics 






markets” tends to undermine the legitimization principles and in-
dustrial relations presupposed by social democracy. In political 
rhetoric, this contradiction translates easily into a problem of per-
ceived lack of moral character and credibility. Meanwhile, the sup-
posed legacy of the Soviet Union has continued to haunt the more 
‘radical’ Left movements and parties, in spite of the fact that a 
number of Marxian intellectuals, movements and parties had al-
ready placed themselves at a critical distance from the practices of 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism as early as the 1920s and 1930s (with a 
new round of critical distance-taking occurring after the scale of 
Stalin’s terror was revealed in the 1950s).2 It is also true, however, 
that many Marxists and communists – including public intellectuals 
such as Samir Amin and Jean-Paul Sartre – continued to rationalize 
variations of the really existing state-socialism well into the 1980s, 
and even beyond.
The Finnish Left Alliance exhibits all these ambiguities in a curi-
ous mixture. An alliance of various pre-existing elements of the 
‘radical’ Left, the program it adopted in its founding meeting is es-
sentially social democratic. It took part in the coalition govern-
ments of Paavo Lipponen (1995-1999 and 1999-2003), consolidat-
ing the process of neoliberalization in Finland (the story is told in 
Patomäki 2007: esp. Chapter 4). As a result, the party was split, 
with those most critical of the policies of Lipponen’s governments 
(involving cuts in social expenditure, privatizations etc.) being typi-
cally those who had been affiliated with the Communist Party in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The ambiguity was deep and ironic: those 
most loyal to social democratic ideals lacked credibility among a 
wider audience because of their past association with the CPSU, 
while those allowing for neoliberal ‘reforms’ risked losing credibili-
ty in relation to fundamental leftist values such as social justice and 
democracy. Moreover, recurrent attempts to foster unity by means 
of internal repression and exclusions worsened the situation, and 
further undermined credibility. Similar developments occurred 
2    For instance, Habermas (1987: 116) summarizes the early history of the 
Frankfurt School: “Critical Theory was initially developed in Horkheimer’s 
circle to think through political disappointments at the absence of revolu-
tion in the West, the development of Stalinism in Soviet Russia, and the 
victory of fascism in Germany. It was supposed to explain mistaken Marx-







again in 2011-2013 when the Left Alliance participated in Jyrki 
Katainen’s (conservative) coalition government. In 2019, the party 
joined Antti Rinne’s (SDP) coalition government (in the wake of a 
postal strike, Sanna Marin became prime minister on 8 December 
2019).
Over time, collective memory shifts. With new generations, the 
composition of an audience also changes. Old memories become 
blurred, and new layers of memories evolve. Thereby also the condi-
tions of credibility change. Like many other similar leftist parties in 
Europe and elsewhere, the Finnish Left Alliance advocates red-
green ideas and culturally liberal values (representing ‘postmaterial 
values’ in terms of Inglehart 1977; 2018). In that regard it competes 
not only with the social democrats but also with the Greens. Mean-
while it has lost a large part of its traditional working class voter 
base. Blue collar workers form an ever-decreasing proportion of the 
workforce, and, moreover, many of the remaining members of this 
demographic have moved ideologically toward populist nationalism. 
Surveys indicate that a majority of unemployed also place greater 
trust in the Finns Party than the social democrats or the Left Alli-
ance. Especially in larger towns, the Left Alliance has become a par-
ty associated with young educated females. Social policy, identity 
politics and green issues have become the main focus of the party. 
Popular assessments of the moral character of the party and its rep-
resentatives continue to be affected by the party’s ambiguous past, 
but in gradually altering ways. In spite of manifold changes both 
within and in the overall context, the Left Alliance’s popularity has 
remained at the relatively low level of 7-9%, and its potential voters 
are confined to those close to its ideas (i.e. voters of social demo-
crats and Greens). It is not geared up to lead national politics.
The role of emotions and populist pathos
Electorally speaking, the most successful leftist parties have 
recently emerged from social movements and various party frag-
ments. Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain were formed in this 
way, and gained wide popularity during the euro crisis of 2010-






and left-wing groups. It rose to a broader awareness with the euro 
crisis, and won the parliamentary elections in January 2015 in 
Greece with a near-majority of parliamentary seats (149/300). Po-
demos was founded in the aftermath of extensive demonstrations 
in 2014 and succeeded in gathering 350,000 members in a short 
period of time and gaining 25% support in Spain. Both have ex-
ploited the populist idea of ‘people’ as a morally good force versus 
the corrupt ‘elite’. One of the essences of populist politics is that it 
is rhetorically capable of uniting a wide range of people and groups 
to resist a common enemy. The goal is to constitute a ‘people’ that 
can be set against the ‘dominant elite’. This was not difficult in 
Greece or Spain during the high point of the economic crisis: Troika 
and the old parties were the elite, austerity the main enemy. 
As new parties, Syriza and Podemos did not carry the historical 
baggage of the past (moreover, the recent pasts of both of these 
countries involved right-wing military dictatorships). They were an-
chored in civil society and spontaneous political movements, which 
rose to oppose the EU and the Troika’s austerity policy. Both par-
ties were consciously left-populist, but in a way that is in part based 
on reflexive political theories developed in the academic world. As 
Dan Hancox explains in an article published in The Guardian:
Syriza built its political coalition in exactly the way Laclau pre-
scribed in his key 2005 book On Populist Reason – as Essex pro-
fessor David Howarth puts it, “binding together different de-
mands by focusing on their opposition to a common enemy” 
(Hancox 2015).
The raison d’être of pathos is to induce a sentiment and judge-
ment about what must be done and what must be changed. The 
two most successful European leftist parties of the 2010s were 
thus able to give emotional meaning to stories explaining problems 
and insecurities of everyday life in terms of the actions and policies 
of the “elite”. But in both cases the success was short-lived. Syriza’s 
attempt to persuade EU leaders as to the irrationality of the rules 
of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), austerity policy and 
privatization failed (the story is told in great and illuminating detail 







sudden turn, as in a classical tragedy, amidst a deep economic crisis 
Alexis Tsipras ignored the results of the Greek referendum and sur-
rendered to the Troika. Yanis Varoufakis resigned, and soon the 
party was split. Syriza and Tsipras remained in power after the Sep-
tember 2015 elections, but from that point on they started to im-
plement the program of their former “enemy”. In the July 2019 
elections, Syriza lost to the centre-right New Democracy party, al-
though it was able to secure its position as the main opposition 
party with 23.8% of the votes.
In a remarkable feat at the Spanish election in December 
2015, Podemos achieved 20.65% of the vote and became the third 
largest party in the Spanish parliament. And yet it could have fared 
even better without the July 2015 debacle in Greece, on the one 
hand, and alleged connections, especially with Venezuela, on the 
other.3 Rather than being inspired merely by Laclau and political 
theory, Podemos had also connections with the leftist-populist 
governments in Latin America. A significant proportion of the fund-
ing for their TV broadcasts and 2015 electoral campaign came from 
consultancy work for those governments (Badcock 2015). Although 
a lack of funding is a major problem for any new party, and al-
though Podemos has been strongly anti-corruption, these kinds of 
connections were widely perceived as a problem of moral charac-
ter. The “people” versus the “dominant elite” story loses part of its 
emotional appeal if the representatives of the “people” appear to 
be enmeshed with “elite” practices either in one’s own country or 
elsewhere. Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela is unlikely to be an appeal-
ing target destination for the direction to be taken in Spain or any 
other European country. Also the escalation of the conflict in Catal-
onia has complicated things for Podemos. It is the only Spain-wide 
party that favours a referendum on self-determination in Catalonia, 
straining its relationship with the Socialists and many voters. Inter-
nal quarrels have further weakened Podemos’s appeal. At the 
3    Wikipedia reports that the party lost much support in the polls during the fi-
nal months of 2015 when elections were approaching (sinking to 13%), 
whereas during the election campaign it experienced a huge rise in support 
in the polls – of up to 20% of the vote – just days before the election, still 






general election in April 2019, it lost 29 seats in the parliament, 
and a further 7 at the general elections in November the same 
year. 
Populism also has limits on its own normative terms. The identity 
politics of recent decades have often been about defining friends and 
enemies, albeit mostly peacefully, or at least non-violently. From a 
democratic leftist perspective, this can be interpreted in the spirit of 
Laclau and Mouffe in terms of agonist politics, in which the adversary 
and the enemy and their existence are also respected, allowing for de-
mocracy, not just confrontation. However, the only confrontation of 
populist rhetoric is not between the “people” and the “elites”. Experi-
ence also shows that Rright-wing populism and the Left can relatively 
easily fall into the same steep confrontation. The line between agonis-
tic and antagonistic politics is thin, and populist identity politics have 
repeatedly amounted to mere hate speech/writing upon social media. 
Moreover, this possibility has been systematically exploited by many 
right-wing nationalist-populist groups, organizations and states. 
There are obvious alternatives, but not without problems of 
their own. Whereas Syriza and Podemos emerged with the promise 
of something radically new – of reforming politics itself in addition 
to opposing austerity, etc. – the established leftist parties have usu-
ally resorted to defending and trying to renew the achievements of 
social democracy. Given the way political concepts remain temporal-
ly organized in the 2010s and 2020s, this boils down to a past-ori-
ented political rhetoric. Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour in the UK and Ber-
nie Sanders’s case for socialism in the US rely on this kind of framing 
of the political situation and possibilities. After decades of neoliber-
alism and rising inequalities in both countries, the younger genera-
tions have started to find the idea of national social democracy 
(with a dose of leftist internationalism) attractive. Following on 
from spontaneous protests – “we are the 99%” – and turning to-
ward concrete policies and institutional proposals, the more leftist 
Democrats – similarly to the supporters of Corbyn’s Labour – have 
often turned their eyes to the achievements of the universalist so-
cial democracy in the Nordic countries. The problem is that they 
have not paid sufficient attention to the causes of the decline of so-
cial democracy and rise of neoliberalism in Sweden, Finland, Norway 







political action is a condition for anything resembling the Nordic 
ideals and ambitions to be realized and further developed under 
new conditions was already being argued two decades ago (Pa-
tomäki 2000).
Even though something like Laclau’s theory of populism might 
well help to increase popularity and build a wide coalition, it does 
not guarantee a successful government or economic policy, let 
alone an ability to change EU or global policies. While Laclau’s theo-
ry is liable to over-politicizing everything, it also tends to see every-
thing in terms of discourse. In a well-known debate with Roy Bhas-
kar in 1998, Laclau struggled to systematically explain how differ-
ent causal mechanisms and processes produce effects in the open 
systems of nature and society. It is impossible to conduct a good 
and successful economic policy unless one has an adequate under-
standing of how political economy mechanisms and processes 
work. An inability to identify those real constraints that a (small) EU 
member state faces, both in the EU and in the intertwined world 
economy, may be equally fatal for any left-wing political project.
Logos as rational understanding of the situation: 
Some preliminary considerations
The fate of Syriza reveals how difficult it is to make even a 
moderate and cautious turn towards a more social-democratic di-
rection (not to mention more ambitious goals) unless there is a 
broader transnational, European or worldwide movement behind 
it. Many citizens across the globe have become disillusioned by na-
tional politics. The latest rounds of globalization have contributed 
to the appearance of a post-democratic bent among many national 
parties (Crouch 2004). This has given real grounds for ‘people’ vs. 
‘elite’ framings. Syriza’s fate was not simply an example of how Mi-
chels’s law of oligarchy works. More importantly, the Greek debacle 
of summer 2015 is an illustration of the power of creditors over 
debtors in the world economy and the lack of equitable rule of law 
in worldwide financial relations. Since the early 1980s, a large num-
ber of countries in the global south have gone through similar ex-






debt campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s (for an overview of the 
movement, see Reyes Tagle and Sehm-Patomäki 2007).
The feasibility of policies depends on trans- and supra-national 
power relations. This is a key reason for the future of the Left being 
bound to the ability to understand the broader context of political 
action. Taking Syriza and Podemos as models is short-sighted un-
less one can reflexively relate the conditions of one’s own actions 
and successes to the constraints imposed by the processes and 
mechanisms of the EU and world economy (including systems of its 
governance). Will and power are connected (as explicated by 
Deutsch 1963). To have narrow power means that one does not 
have to give up, but can force others to do so. EU leaders and the 
IMF were capable of exercising narrow power over Greece. When 
such power exists, there is no need to learn. The position of EU de-
cision-makers was simply that the Greek government must give up 
and retreat from its electoral program – and preferably organize a 
new referendum (unexpected result in July 2015) or election (suc-
ceeded in September 2015) – to cancel the mandate given to Syriza 
in January 2015 elections.
The narrow power of the EU leadership or organizations such 
as the IMF is not the only obstacle to successful leftist policy. From 
the point of view of economic policy, the essential totality is not 
the state but the world economy, of which the EU is but a part. The 
interdependence between the parts and the whole works, for ex-
ample, through effective aggregate demand and the multiplier ef-
fect. A significant part of the impact of the expansionary economic 
policy flows abroad. This also applies to the EU as a whole, assum-
ing that it would pursue its own fiscal policy. The difference is that, 
for most member states, the ratio of exports to GDP is 40-90%, but 
for the EU as a whole this figure stands at around 15%. Thus, a key 
problem is the absence of EU fiscal capacities. In the absence of 
systems that would ensure a sufficiently high level of actual de-
mand for the goods and services produced, politico-economic de-
velopments tend to lead to overcapacity and unemployment. What 
matters is whether potential consumers and investors can afford 
to buy goods and services. Propensity to consume tends to fall as 








It is up to public authorities to ensure full employment and to 
promote and direct investment and growth. The problem is that 
the more intertwined economic activities are, the wider the effects 
of state economic policy will spread. In addition, individual state ac-
tors always look at things from their own limited point of view, and 
often commit the fallacy of composition. The fallacy of composi-
tion generally stems from the assumption of what is possible for 
one is possible for all (or at least many) actors at the same time. For 
example, if many states try to move their economic problems 
abroad by increasing the volume of exports relative to imports 
through internal devaluation and competitiveness policies, their 
economic policies are contradictory, with the result tending to be 
detrimental to all (or at least most) of them. Our fates are irrevers-
ibly intertwined.
Keynes (1969) argued that the world economy is character-
ized by contradictions in trade and finance that can – and must – 
be overcome by better common institutions (see Markwell 2006). 
In the absence of adequate common institutions, and faced by 
the fear of a spiral of downward developments, states tend to 
engage in counterproductive policies that are aimed toward at 
maximizing economic growth through competitiveness. ‘Differ-
ences in competitive power, whatever their origin, [can easily] 
set up a spiral of divergence’ (Robinson 1980: 39). Short-sighted 
and contradictory methods of responding to problems of the 
world economy are both the cause and effect of additional prob-
lems. The process tends to reinforce itself, partly because dy-
namics lead to political changes within and across states, often 
deepening and entrenching myopic self-regarding orientations. 
In the context of re-territorialized competition between states, 
super-states and blocs, the dynamics of the system can thus lead 
to securitization, enemy-construction, new alliances and an arms 
race. The paradox of (neo)liberal globalization is that, in the end, 
it will instigate the closing of the mind and borders. The de-glo-
balization triggered by the COVID-19 crisis is historically deeply 
rooted in these processes.
Many leftist movements and parties have favoured sover-
eign-state-based policies and institutional arrangements. A num-






globalization and exposing the ways in which they have been 
mobilized for specific political purposes. This critical project can 
take a variety of forms. A careful look at recent developments 
shows that there is, in fact, a variety of capitalisms that can be 
successful (Hall & Soskice 2001; Clark 2016). What is needed is 
smart globalization, not hyper-globalization (Rodrik 2011). The 
state can be reclaimed and the social-democratic project resusci-
tated. The state is more autonomous than usually assumed, al-
though the full realization of its sovereignty may require institu-
tional changes, for instance exit from the eurozone. On the oth-
er hand, even those committed to ethical cosmopolitanism may 
start to see such an exit as the only option in the face of supra-
national powers-that-be. For example, in spring 2015 Varoufakis 
and James K. Galbraith started to prepare for a Greek exit from 
the euro, as nothing else seemed to help (reported in Galbraith 
2016). This attempt ended abruptly with the result of the July 
2015 referendum.
Currently perhaps the most popular variant of this autonomy 
thesis is based on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT; for a popular 
introduction, Wray 2012) and the idea of monetary sovereignty 
(Mitchell & Fazi 2017). This claims that if a state can finance its ex-
penditures in its own currency, it faces no budgetary constraint in 
normal situations. States are sovereign, or at least they would be, 
if they were to emancipate themselves, at least to a sufficient de-
gree, from the ‘self-imposed’ constraints now operating through 
various international organizations and legal arrangements. Aus-
terity is not only irrational; it is also unnecessary. A central claim 
of MMT is that valid money is state-authorized and essentially re-
lated to its capacity to tax. Assuming a system of floating ex-
change rates, a government that is sovereign in monetary terms – 
that has its own currency and central bank – can, and should, use 
fiscal policy to achieve full employment, creating new money to 
fund governmental expenditure. A government that has the pow-
er to create its own money cannot default on debt denominated 
in its own currency. The power of transnational ideas, internation-
al organizations and international law that currently determine 








It is beyond the scope of the current paper to go into the de-
tails of this theory and its problems.4 Suffice it to say that MMT is 
right in claiming that a central bank can be used to finance public 
deficits more easily than is conventionally assumed (the unconven-
tional monetary policies of Fed and ECB can be taken as proof of 
something similar to this, see e.g. Marcuzzo 2017). Nonetheless, vi-
able economic policy cannot be built on merely on the capacities of 
a national central bank. A large portion of the impact of expansion-
ary economic policy will be external. Differences in production ca-
pacities and competitive power cannot be reduced to fiscal spend-
ing alone. Current account deficits can cause problems. The world 
economy is tightly interconnected also at the level of investment 
and relationships relating to production. Moreover, although the 
quantitative theory of money has failed time and again to provide a 
general explanation of inflation, it does not necessarily follow that 
increasing public spending by creating money would not reduce 
trust in the economic policy of the state and give rise to inflation. 
In open systems, the same phenomenon can be manifested as a 
result of different causal processes. For example, several 
post-Keynesians regard inflation as being an outcome of an unre-
solved distributional conflict, with such socio-economic conflicts 
4   For a popular discussion on the MMT and its merits and problems, see Pa-
tomäki (2020). In contrast to what MMT purports, not all money is debt 
and not all debt is money (except by way of tautologically defining money 
as debt and vice versa, however counter-intuitively). The acceptance of 
something as money is a matter of social positioning, and, amongst other 
things, requires trust, which is always a matter of degree (Lawson 2018; 
2019: Chapter 6, “The positioning and credit theories of money com-
pared”). Moreover, although the quantity theory of money is wrong, and 
although state finances are not as such dependent on (international) bond 
markets, it is not true that there is no budgetary constraint until the level 
of full employment of all resources is reached. Existing resources are never 
fully in use; and in a world of continuous and nested, looped and overlap-
ping processes, forces of production are changing all the time. It is these 
dynamics that matter (e.g. Kaldor 1972). Moreover, in an interdependent 
economy with many sectors and complex input-output relations (often 
spanning the globe), local bottleneck sectors are likely to emerge, starting 
to speed up inflation. The inflationary process is historical and path-de-
pendent, and evolves through the interdependence of different sectors 
and positionings in the world economy. It is also related to and affected by 
habits, class structures, trust and legitimacy (Shaikh 2016: Chapter 15). 







usually being seen as conditioned by the institutional context (e.g. 
Burdekin and Burkett 1996). In an open social system, any concrete 
inflationary process is path-dependent, and evolves through the in-
terdependence of different sectors, actors and policies. In many situ-
ations, the problem of inflation could best be solved through new in-
stitutional arrangements, such as democratizing the ‘economic’ (on 
the implications of reflexivity, see Patomäki 2019b). In addition, the 
problem of instability of global finance does not go away just by in-
creasing the degree of national monetary autonomy. Finally yet im-
portantly, a sovereignty-centred leftist project could also co-contrib-
ute to the closing of minds and borders, over time giving rise to im-
port-substituting strategies and similar tendencies. This closing can 
have cumulative and potentially fateful consequences, due to the in-
terconnectedness of global political economy. 
The future of the Left and the global Double movement
A possible way of making sense of many of recent politico-eco-
nomic developments is through Karl Polanyi’s (1957) thesis about a 
historical ‘double movement’. In his Great Transformation, Polanyi 
argued that the 18th and 19th century construction of a self-regulat-
ing market led to (often anxious) political responses advocating so-
cial self-protection and decommodification. The self-regulating 
market has social effects that evoke society to protect and reassert 
itself against the commodification of land, labour, social relations, 
and many natural things. One of the possible syntheses of a variety 
of related responses led to the development of the democratic 
welfare state, which constituted a historical novelty. It re-embed-
ded markets in social relations and ethico-political considerations, 
and decommodified aspects of society (e.g. health and education), 
but by a different method than had previously been witnessed with 
the mediaeval guilds or the absolutism of the mercantilist state. 
The process of developing democratic welfare states contin-
ued for several decades. Relatively soon, however, the twin process-
es of economic globalization and neoliberalization started to fash-
ion a new round of the ‘first movement’. A new process of commod-







strength. Assuming that Polanyi’s scheme holds true also in the 21st 
century, we should expect society to rise once again to protect it-
self from the present-day version of the ‘stark utopia’ of self-regu-
lating markets. During the process, the relevant spatial scale has 
changed (in the 1940s, the world economy was in an exceptional 
state of disintegration as a result of the dual catastrophes of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War). The most plausible 
explanation for the rise of neoliberalism is that it emerged from the 
discrepancy between the world of territorial states and spaces of 
the globalizing capitalist market economy, and became a self-rein-
forcing process. 
The global ‘first movement’ started with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. The absence of adequate 
common global institutions set the context for the unilateral deci-
sion of the Nixon regime to set the US dollar on a floating ex-
change rate system and to deregulate finance. Other standard ex-
planations of the change of the era include: (i) a turn to ‘modern’ 
free-market economics was a ‘rational’ response to the problems 
caused by Keynesianism such as inflation (mainstream economics); 
(ii) changes in the relationships of production toward post-Fordism 
led to neoliberal globalization (French regulation school); (iii) neo-
liberalism is an attempt to restore the position of upper classes 
(David Harvey); (iv) neoliberalism is an attempt to restore the posi-
tion of the US and the UK in the world economy (Peter Gowan). 
None of the standard explanations is categorically wrong, but each 
covers only limited aspects of the causal complex. 
As there are many different economic theories, why was the 
standard neoclassical framing and response to inflation and unem-
ployment adopted so widely? For example, many post-Keynesians 
had anticipated the problem of inflation decades before it actually 
occurred. ‘Post-Fordism’ is more a result of neoliberalization than its 
cause, although it is not reducible to it (and also information tech-
nologies, globalization, etc. matter). Growing inequality is in part a 
result of neoliberal economics and has clearly motivated some ac-
tors, and yet the Lockean (capitalist) sense of justice has always 
been a part of the capitalist market society. While the US and the 
UK have been active players, the key choices – although alternative 






The explanatory hypothesis presented here is that the general 
tendency towards the prevalence of free market orthodoxy be-
comes stronger when: (1) the economic developments seem fa-
vourable in the world economy, i.e. when there is stable growth 
and high employment, at least in the centres of the world econo-
my, and inflation is increasingly seen as the main problem (and thus 
demands for monetarism and for financial de-regulation and liber-
alization, etc., arise); and (2) the position of private capital becomes 
more secure in terms of structural power and/or political position-
ing. The key condition explaining the shift toward more secure cap-
ital concerns the discrepancy between (a) the limited reach of terri-
torial states and (b) an increasingly open liberal world economy. 
The origins of neoliberalization lie in the struggles over income dis-
tribution, competitiveness and power in the context of this grow-
ing discrepancy.5
Already in the 1960s and 1970s, some actors had begun to ex-
ploit this discrepancy in struggles over income distribution and 
power. As this project has succeeded in transforming national, Eu-
ropean and global institutions, it has further deepened and consoli-
dated the underlying discrepancy. For the Left, this discrepancy is 
an obstacle that must be overcome; and it can be best overcome 
by globalizing democratic-socialist politics. While the first Polanyian 
double movement was instituted through the modern national 
states, the first phase of the new ‘double movement’ has thus far 
been largely realized via systems of regional and global gover-
nance. Will the second phase be equally globalist? This raises the 
question of transformative agency. Robert Cox wrote in 1996:
[…] a protective response at the level of global society has yet 
to take form. Yet the elements of opposition to the socially 
disruptive consequences of globalization are visible. The ques-
tion remains open as to what forms these may take, as to 
whether and how they may become more coherent and more 
powerful, so that historical thesis and antithesis may lead to a 
new synthesis. (Cox 1996: 528)







Following the rise of a global civil society and alter-globaliza-
tion movement in the 1990s, the turn of the new century saw the 
creation of a self-consciously political expression of global civil so-
ciety in the form of the World Social Forum (WSF), inaugurated in 
June 2001 with an international meeting of 12,000 activists in Por-
to Alegre, Brazil. This was a critical response to the World Econom-
ic Forum (Davos). The logic was the same as in Polanyi’s ‘double 
movement’: from a self-regulating market to the protection and 
development of the social. In the years that followed, such global 
meetings grew larger, and regional meetings were spawned, pro-
viding a rolling series of vital platforms for interchange and net-
working among diverse civil society actors. However, the WSF has 
suffered from an internal contradiction between its promise to fa-
cilitate the transition to a better world and its central organizing 
principle of simply providing an open space. Political agency re-
quires transformative capacity, which a mere open space for dis-
course lacks. Because the WSF has remained hesitant to move into 
the realm of action, interest has waned, leaving the WSF’s future 
fragile and uncertain – and increasingly confined to Brazil. In 2019, 
with the rise of Jair Bolsonaro and his proto-fascist regime in Brazil, 
the WSF seems all but finished. While it continues to exist, with the 
next WSF being set to take place in Mexico in 2021, the enthusiasm 
is gone (the 2021 WSF was eventually organised only virtually).
Even when there is a need and opportunity for something, 
‘whether or not [the actors] take it is up to them’ (Cox 1996: 533). 
What is more, there are also limits to understanding history 
through the basic Polanyian scheme (more detailed discussion in 
Patomäki 2014). Because of Polanyi’s highly idealized and ab-
stract concept of the market, his lumping together of all forms of 
‘social protection’, even when the protection may serve the pur-
poses of, say, large landowners’ specific interests or militarist na-
tionalism, was somewhat misleading. The curtailing of the market 
may also coincide with an assault upon the rules, customs and in-
stitutions that protect labour rights, as in Nazi Germany or Soviet 
Russia. Contra Polanyi, it is also possible that an enlightened capi-
talist may realize that healthy, highly skilled and motivated work-
ers are better for production than miserable slum dwellers with 






latter have been largely replaced by machinery). In other words, 
there is no singular ‘thesis Æ antithesis Æ synthesis’ movement. 
Rather, the reality involves complex multi-path developmental 
processes that can be interwoven or contradictory in numerous 
ways. Also for this reason it is thus clear that the new double 
movement will not come about semi-automatically, but can only 
be realized through transformative praxis. The argument here is 
that the future of the Left is dependent on whether it can devel-
op this kind of global transformative praxis: the process that be-
gan in the 1990s may well take several decades.
The new ‘great transformation’ of remaking the market soci-
ety is spatially more extended and institutionally more en-
trenched than in the 19th century. An unprecedented way of see-
ing and constituting society as a market – understood through 
the categories of neoclassical economics, rational choice theory 
and business studies – has not only become prevalent but is now 
largely taken for granted in numerous everyday practices. Inter-
pretations of episodes such as Brexit and the rise of Donald 
Trump to the US presidency in terms of the double movement 
are thus problematic: it is not evident that populist–nationalist 
movements and parties in Europe or elsewhere are trying to pro-
tect themselves ‘from the predatory nature of market funda-
mentalism’ (Pettifor 2017: 127), but rather, many, perhaps most, 
of these movements and parties have adopted market funda-
mentalism as part of their platform, albeit in a somewhat ambig-
uous manner. Largely as a consequence of the rise of Trump, ‘a 
lack of consensus even on what a liberal order is’ has emerged 
(Leonard 2017). There is a growing perception and global com-
mentary that the era of Western liberal dominance is ending, and 
that a post-Western world order is dawning. At the same time, to 
the extent that a Polanyian double movement is in motion, right-
wing ideological manifestations are increasing in dominance, and 
may be paving the way not only to trade wars, but also to a glob-







Socialism and the rational tendential direction 
of World history in the 21st century
Leaving the sphere of intimacy aside, in capitalist market soci-
ety where marketization prevails, people relate to one another in-
strumentally (as means to other ends such as profits), through the 
commodity form and by buying or selling labour power, which is 
the basis of relations of power within the firm, and in work-related 
organizations more generally. Socialism started to lose its power to 
inspire when it accepted marketization – even if only in a qualified 
form – as a desirable (or at least necessary) direction under the cur-
rent circumstances, including the collapse of ‘true’ state socialism, 
economic globalization, decreasing numbers of blue collar voters, 
increased consumerism and the prevalence of individualism. Espe-
cially within the OECD world, GDP growth has slowed down, while 
the overall developments have primarily benefitted the wealthiest. 
Alternative indicators tell us that GDP is becoming increasingly dis-
connected from sustainable welfare or wellbeing. Unemployment 
has of late been, on average, higher than it was during the social 
democratic (and state socialist) era, and conditions of employment 
have become ever-more precarious (Patomäki 2018).
A sense of disillusionment and hopelessness is widespread. 
The more deeply the world has become neoliberalized, the more 
commonsensical neoliberalism has become. The language of every-
day practices at home, school and the workplace borrows increas-
ingly from the prevailing discourses of corporations and media, 
even if sometimes only ironically. Overwhelming evidence seems 
to support the idea that neoliberalism is ‘the only game in town’. It 
has become a culture that is being reproduced through 
self-fulfilling expectations.6 In this process, actors increasingly lock 
6   The idea of culture as a self-fulfilling prophecy is that actors act on the ba-
sis of beliefs they have about their environment and others, which tends 
to reproduce those beliefs and mutual expectations. From a sociological 
perspective, the most interesting situation is one in which the self-fulfill-
ing prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation but 
evokes a new behaviour which makes the originally false conception come 
true (Merton 1948: 195). Ethnic and racial prejudices provide a good ex-
ample of this: The belief that others (members of some out-group) are in-
ferior or untrustworthy sustains practices of exclusion and/or unequal 






themselves into particular epistemic positions, which may also be-
come constitutive of their mode of being and agency. Over time, 
this process may lead to pathological learning to the extent that it 
involves a reduction in collective learning capacity – less openness 
to surprises and discoveries – and a narrowing of power and hard-
ening of the will (as briefly explained above). 
In the course of this self-reinforcing process, various layers of 
illusion, such as narcissism of the collective memory (actors only 
see themselves and their own unique success or suffering in the 
mirror of history) and a Manichean dualism of good and evil (neo-
liberalism defines what is good and deviations from it are seen as 
approaching evil to a more or lesser degree), also begin to play an 
increasingly important role. Two things happen simultaneously. 
For a hardened neoliberal will, the more there are recurring prob-
lems and apparent threats as well as differences, resistance and 
conflicts, the more there are reasons to impose one’s will – vision 
of a free, efficient and just market society – even against resis-
tance. For the discontent masses, there remains the option of 
populist identity politics. Instead of hope, action is motivated by 
hatred of ‘X’, which is allegedly responsible for the current prob-
lems. ‘X’ denotes an abstract social position that can be filled in in 
principle with anything (X could also be seen as an empty signifi-
er). Whereas the basic populist antagonism faces off the ‘people’ 
and the ‘elite’, in contemporary ‘developed’ world contexts the 
guilty others and associated groups usually also include refugees, 
immigrants, Islamists, Greens and leftists, political and cultural 
elites, and the ‘mainstream’ media.
A sense of hopelessness should start to disappear once pow-
erful reinterpretations of contemporary conditions demonstrate 
that alternatives do, in fact, exist. Syriza and Podemos have sought 
inspiration from left-wing populism in theory (Laclau) and in 
evidence for the original belief. Similarly, many neoliberal practices and in-
stitutional arrangements are based on neoclassical economics, theories of 
rational and public choice, and related theories of organizations (e.g. New 
Public Management) that impose an economistic logic upon a variety so-
cial situations strongly encouraging (if not enforcing) behaviour in line 
with the atomistic and amoral logic of homo economicus that informs 
those theories in the first place. For discussions about the performative 







practice (in Latin America). A number of leftist intellectuals have in-
voked Polanyi not only to explain what is happening but also to 
give reasons for being hopeful about a different future. The idea is 
that from Polanyi we know that society is bound to protect itself 
against the market; and it seems certain that one change will be 
followed by a different one. But this is very abstract. Expressed as 
a conviction in inevitable historical development or in mechanical 
metaphors such as the pendulum, the ‘double movement’ interpre-
tation of the current conjuncture can all too easily be criticized as a 
mere dream or desire. The vision of MMT is more concrete, which is 
probably the reason for its gaining popularity among leftist politi-
cians. It can be read as a concrete utopian exercise, aiming at pin-
pointing a real, but non-actualized, possibility inherent in modern 
capitalist states, thus inspiring grounded hope to inform emancipa-
tory praxis (cf. Bhaskar 2010: 84). But it also has a utopian side: the 
power of the central bank to create money emerges almost as a 
kind of deus ex machina making national social democracy possible 
again. Paradoxically for a socialist vision, however, the good is 
equated with more money in a capitalist market society, even 
though this money is intended, first and foremost, for public 
spending.
If socialism is to regain its power to inspire, its fundamental 
principles and conceptions must be rearticulated in relation to the 
conditions of 21st century world politics and economy. Axel Hon-
neth’s The Idea of Socialism (2017) is a step in this direction. The 
concept of social freedom entails that individual freedoms can be 
made to coincide with the requirement of coexistence in solidari-
ty. The idea is to free the human subjects as bearers of progress 
from dependencies and mere external negative determinations, 
and to enable them to reason freely and together on the subject 
of their aims in an autonomous manner. The question of how to 
best realize social freedom in various spheres of social life, includ-
ing – and especially – the ‘economic’, can be based on experimen-
tation with different combinations of institutional arrangements 
and mechanisms. 
While we must fundamentally exclude any certainty about the 
final state of the process, ‘we must welcome all proposals that are 






dependencies, thus enabling them to view themselves as free con-
tributors to the task of equally satisfying the needs of all members 
of society, a task that can only be fulfilled in reciprocity’ (Honneth 
2017, 69). However, in a functionally differentiated society, social 
freedoms do not concern only the historically separated field of 
the ‘economy’, but, just as importantly, also social freedoms both 
in the intimate sphere and in the processes of democratic will for-
mation in the wider community. Political community can no longer 
be merely associated with the nation-state:
The socialist doctrine must therefore progress along with this 
tendency toward international interdependence by no longer re-
specting national borders in its experimental search for possibili-
ties of expanding social freedom. And because, as we have seen, 
the initiative for such experimental explorations must somehow 
come from the democratic public sphere, this initiative would 
soon need to be transnationalized in order to be able to stand 
up to opposing international forces. (Honneth 2017, 100)
The key point is that any ‘initiative would soon need to be 
transnationalized in order to be able to stand up to opposing inter-
national forces’. The wider context of situational experimentation 
with various possibilities of social organization concerns world poli-
tics and the governance of world economy . This wider context 
must be made conducive to experimentation and itself be democ-
ratized.7 As already argued, in practice it is difficult to make even a 
moderate and cautious turn towards a more social-democratic di-
rection – not to mention more ambitious experimental goals – un-
less there is a broader transnational, European or worldwide move-
ment behind it. There is no automatic or mechanical ‘double move-
ment’; instead, world history depends on agency, and this on a 
7    Honneth notes that, given the prevailing consciousness and political econ-
omy dynamics, the progressive democratic socialist project is torn be-
tween avant-gardism (cosmopolitanism, disregarding many of the prevail-
ing sentiments and identities) and populism (nationalism and various an-
tagonisms, disregarding the real world-historical conditions of increasing 
social freedoms). He concludes that the democratic and socialist project 
must be organized on a global scale, but ‘socialism must take local action 







global (as opposed to local) scale. The discrepancy between territo-
rial states and global capital is an obstacle that can be best over-
come by globalizing democratic-socialist politics. And while, for ex-
ample, MMT theorists are right in criticizing the orthodox economic 
theory and prevailing ideas about budgetary constraints, they tend 
to exaggerate the possibilities inherent in the national money-issu-
ing powers of the central bank and downplay potentials for orga-
nizing similar powers on a European or global scale.
There is nothing inevitable in world history: it is both open-end-
ed and dependent on agency. In a given situation, understood in 
terms of wide historical processes, there can nonetheless be a ratio-
nal tendential direction: rational because there are good reasons 
for it, and tendential because some real forces have a capacity to 
take world history in that particular direction. Three elements of ra-
tionality constitute the tendential directionality of world history. 
The first is truth, involving criticism of falsehoods and attitudes that 
sustain falsehoods. The second concerns overcoming contradictions 
through collective action and common institutions, such as those 
identified by Keynes at the level of the world economy as a whole. 
Contradictions can be overcome by building adequate common in-
stitutions such as clearing unions or tax systems, but the emergent 
question – Exactly what institutions would be most adequate? – in-
volves ethical and political considerations. Thus, the third element 
of rationality involves normative universalizability and our capacity 
to resolve social conflicts. The idea of social freedom belongs here, 
for the idea is that real freedom must be universalizable: everyone 
has equal concrete possibilities for realizing their aims and each per-
son is, ideally, concerned with the self-realization of others for 
non-instrumental reasons. 
Ethical and political learning concerns reasoning about social 
rules and principles. The more adequate the cognitive scheme of 
reasoning is for human cooperation and for resolving conflicts, the 
better it is. Normatively, a key consideration is the degree of gener-
alizability – indicating acceptability and stability of judgements in 
differentiated and complex multi-actor contexts – and the related 
capacity for abstract role-taking. The self learns to assume the role 
and perspective of others. Higher-stage reasoning is more differen-






and more integrated (implying symmetry and consistence) than 
that of prior stages.8 
Cosmopolitan democratic socialism is thus reliant on process-
es of moral learning, and social contexts can be made be more fa-
vourable to such learning. However, these remain fairly abstract 
notions. To inspire hope, transformative praxis has to be processu-
al, developmental and directional, involving political programs 
specifying aims and concrete utopias. Its organizational forms must 
be compatible with these requirements; its means and ends must 
be consistent.
Conclusions
The basic thrust of the argument outlined in his chapter sug-
gests (in terms of pathos) a political narrative. Far from being ex-
hausted as a project, a grand task awaits the Left. Social freedom 
can be increased. Obstacles can be removed. Existing global politi-
cal economy contradictions and global problems can be resolved 
by means of rational collective actions and by building more ade-
quate common institutions. A learning process towards qualitative-
ly higher levels of reflexivity can help develop regional and global 
transformative agency. Thus, collective actions are likely to involve 
new forms of political agency such as global political parties (Pa-
tomäki 2011; 2019a). The Left must be bold and declare that there 
is a rational tendential direction of world history toward something 
akin to democratic global Keynesianism that, in turn, will enable 
processes of decommodification and new syntheses concerning 
the market/social nexus, in the spirit of social experimentation.
While it is true that the prevailing sentiments and identities 
and political economy dynamics support populist framings and 
8   Here I am most indebted to Lawrence Kohlberg (1981), see especially 
Chapters “From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and 
Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development” and “The Claim to 
Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment”. Kohlberg died in 
1987, but subsequent research has largely confirmed, method-inde-
pendently, the existence of a common scheme of development of moral 
reasoning and judgement, and related social perspective-taking, across a 







antagonistic identity politics, it is also noteworthy that right-wing 
nationalist populism usually fails to attract younger generations, 
even when they lack hope and belief in the possibility of a better 
future. This indicates that there is room for further ethical and po-
litical learning. The idea of transformative global agency must 
make a wide rational appeal across different social classes: ‘this is 
what is reasonable for us to do!’. In addition to the perceptions of 
shared risks on our small planet, and the acute sense of injustices 
and asymmetries of power, what is important is that there is also a 
positive – rational and tendential – direction. This is a left-wing vi-
sion that can inspire optimism and ambition about our future possi-
bilities. To truly inspire hope, this vision must involve political pro-
grams specifying aims and concrete utopias (with both being sub-
jected to critical debate). A series of feasible and compatible politi-
cal economy reforms can be put together and forged into a 
strategy of democratic global Keynesian transformations. Some 
steps forward can also be achieved at the regional level, such as 
within the EU, and in specific functional areas. 
It would be a mistake to conclude that, because developments 
are not smooth and linear, and because many developments seem 
regressive or chaotic, there is no rational tendential direction to 
world history. The main idea is that accumulation of relatively small 
(‘quantitative’) changes in specific areas can lead to ruptures and 
sudden transformations (‘qualitative changes’) in others, as issues 
and processes are linked. After reaching a critical point, changes fa-
vouring a particular direction can become mutually (self-)reinforc-
ing, and this should also be their deliberate purpose. As a result 
one world-historical developmental path will come to be replaced 
by another. This will be the end of neoliberalism and its increasingly 
regressive and dangerous aftermath, and the beginning of some-
thing better, something that can both facilitate new emancipatory 
experiments pertaining to social freedom across a variety of social 
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